Volume 38, Issue 3 – Janet C. Hoeffel¥ and Stephen I. Singer¥¥
On this fiftieth anniversary of Brady v. Maryland,[1] it is fitting that criminal procedure scholars take the Brady doctrine out and give it another sound beating.[2] While the Brady case itself held promise for the promotion of justice and fairness in criminal trials, its progeny, and the mistaken interpretations of that case law, decimated any such hope. Brady held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.”[3] The most straight-forward reading of Brady in context was that the word “material” meant “relevant,” in the typical evidentiary sense, making the prosecutorial duty to disclose before and at trial familiar and easily understood by trial lawyers and judges.[4] If the information “would tend to exculpate [the defendant] or reduce the penalty,”[5] then it was a violation of due process if the prosecutor did not disclose the evidence. That reading of “material” did not last long.